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Macroeconomic trends in 
Paraguay from 1989 to 1997: 
consumption bubble 
and financial crisis 
Stéphane Straub 
Adviser to the Executive This article looks at macroeconomic trends in Paraguay 
Secretary for Planning, since 1989: a critical date, because it marks the return to 
Office of the President democracy and a move towards liberalization of the econ-
ofthe Republic of Paraguay. oniy- ^ n e stabilization process embarked upon at that time 
resulted in favourable evolution of the monetary variables, 
but not of investment or of growth of the product. The com-
bination of heavy inflows of capital and an excessive in-
crease in aggregate demand gave rise to a growing external 
imbalance reflected in a domestic consumption bubble. 
Trade transactions which are not officially registered -a 
special feature of the Paraguayan economy- have affected 
the evolution of the macroeconomic situation and appear 
to have contributed to the worsening of the trends in ques-
tion, since there was also a deficit on this type of trade up 
to 1994. In the financial sector, the liberalization process 
was not accompanied by the strengthening of banking su-
pervision. In this permissive context, the financial sector 
has contributed to the consumption bubble of the 1990s, 
through the proliferation of high-risk activities, loans to en-
terprises linked with the lenders themselves, and the rapid 
growth of an informal or "black" financial sector. The re-
sulting increasingly fragile situation of many financial es-
tablishments explains why a combination of domestic and 
external upsets led in 1995 to a financial crisis which had 
recessionary effects on the whole economy. Failure to take 
care of elements of such fundamental importance as the 
monitoring of excess spending and the modernization of 
banking supervision, and the mistaken option for a model 
based on imports and informal trade, facilitated the procure-
ment of quasi-privilege rents by certain interest groups and 
the formation of consumption bubbles which contributed to 
the crisis. What is needed, then, is a sustainable macroe-
conomic policy aimed at promoting growth on the basis of 
a process of genuine innovation. 
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I 
Introduction 
The economic evolution of Paraguay since the return 
to democracy in 1989 has displayed favourable fea-
tures. Throughout the 1990s, the country maintained 
a satisfactory fiscal balance; inflation was gradually 
brought down, reaching a single digit in 1996; the 
level of the international reserves rose; and the exter-
nal public debt went down until in 1996 it only rep-
resented around 14% of GDP: the lowest relative level 
in Latin America. On the other hand, however, the 
product grew only slightly and per capita GDP did not 
increase at all. 
At the same time, various problems were arising, 
as in other countries of the region. At the macroe-
conomic level, the lower inflation was achieved 
through a policy of control of the money supply and 
an exchange rate anchor, accompanied by a fiscal 
austerity strategy, but not enough attention was paid 
to such fundamental aspects as aggregate demand, 
which registered high growth rates during the period. 
This situation gave rise to growing external imbal-
ances, with an average annual growth rate of imports 
which was much higher than that of exports. More-
over, the imports were increasingly made up of con-
sumer goods. 
As a corollary to this, there was a growing in-
flow of volatile capital in the first part of the decade. 
In these circumstances, in which domestic demand 
was rising but domestic saving was falling and being 
progressively replaced by external saving, gross 
fixed capital formation stagnated and it became im-
possible to keep up the level of absorption reached. 
Section II of this article analyses this evolution 
and the behaviour of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables and shows how the elements in question helped 
to form a consumption bubble which made future 
contraction inevitable, as occurred in 1995. 
Section III looks at the theory according to 
which the excess of imported goods and the apparent 
difference between domestic expenditure and GDP is 
really the result of Paraguay's traditional re-export 
trade, in which the goods imported for subsequent sale 
abroad are registered but not the actual re-exports. It is 
shown that the various available estimates largely 
disprove this explanation and that there may even 
have been a deficit on this unregistered trade too, 
because part of the unregistered imports remained in 
the country instead of being re-exported, thus feeding 
the domestic consumption bubble. 
Section IV examines the state of the financial 
system after the liberalization begun in the early 
1990s. This liberalization was carried out in a context 
of feeble prudential regulation rules and ineffective 
supervision of their application, with a Central Bank 
which had little de facto autonomy. In this context, 
fraudulent practices and administrative mismanage-
ment abounded because of the lack of supervision by 
the responsible authorities. At the same time, the di-
chotomous situation of the financial system, in which 
sound and efficient establishments operated side-
by-side with others whose practices were not in keep-
ing with the rules of good management, was reflected 
in the persistence of high interest rates throughout the 
period and the rationing of credit to the detriment 
of part of the production sector, namely, small and 
medium-sized enterprises which were not linked with 
some banking group. 
The consumption bubble was reflected in the fi-
nancial sphere in a credit boom (without pretending 
to identify the direction of the causality between the 
two phenomena) which extended to the whole finan-
cial system, although most markedly to the domesti-
cally owned banking sector. The situation was made 
worse by big capital inflows attracted by the high 
prevailing interest rates. Because of the weakness of 
supervision, these flows fed the boom in loans for 
consumption, speculative and short-term financial ac-
tivities, operations in the informal sector, and real-
estate speculation, etc., which led to an excessive 
concentration of economic activity in high-risk 
sectors generating little value added. This accumula-
tion of high-risk portfolios, facilitated by the implicit 
State guarantee on deposits and the scale attained by 
malpractices, seems to have been responsible for 
many of the banking failures which took place from 
1995 onwards. 
To the extent that the net worth of firms was 
weakened by numerous risky unregistered operations 
-generally carried out at very high interest rates-, by 
loans made to their own associates, etc., they were 
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the first to be affected by a series of events in 1995 
which included the decline in international soybean 
prices, the partial reversal of capital flows, and a do-
mestic financial scandal. The financial crisis which 
began in 1995 is seen as a process of correction in 
which an external shock subjected the banking sys-
tem to excessive tensions and led to the breakage of 
its weakest links: in this case, the high-risk and/or 
illegal activities. Through its impact on the informal 
credit system, this financial crisis had repercussions 
on the whole economy and gave rise to a major re-
cessive adjustment. 
In the light of the foregoing, by way of conclu-
sion, the concluding section sets forth some guide-
II 
The evolution of the macroeconomic indicators in 
Paraguay between 1989 and 1997 shows the results 
of the stabilization policy undertaken in the new con-
text of liberalization and sound management which 
accompanied the return to democracy. In particular, 
during this period fiscal management was satisfac-
tory (the central government deficit never exceeded 
0.8% of GDP, while the non-financial public sector 
maintained a surplus throughout the period) and in-
flation was brought down steadily from the peak 
level reached in 1990 (table 1). 
Various sectors of the economy were liberalized. 
The exchange rate, which had previously had multi-
ple rates and was subject to political manipulation, 
was replaced by a single floating exchange rate. In-
terest rates were freed and foreign currency opera-
tions were authorized. Monetary policy management 
was placed on a sounder basis, and after 1990 the 
automatic rediscounting granted to certain sectors' 
(especially cotton) and the possibility of monetary 
financing of the public sector were eliminated. Dur-
ing the period, there was an increase in the interna-
tional reserves, which amounted to US$ 1062 million 
1
 The rediscounting was not completely eliminated, however, 
since as explained in section IV, up to 1994 there was a sys-
tem of indirect rediscounting through the reduction of the 
compulsory reserve requirements connected with the financing 
of cotton. 
lines for a sustainable macroeconomic policy pro-
gramme for Paraguay aimed not only at stabilization 
but also at growth. Finally, it is noted as a basis for 
future analysis that the bubble phenomenon observed 
may be ascribed to the exploitation of what Nochteff 
(1996) calls "quasi privilege rents": a system in 
which dominant interest groups take advantage of 
their influence on institutions to perpetuate those 
rents at different levels (importation and re-export of 
smuggled goods, financial and real-estate specula-
tion). In many cases this phenomenon impeded the 
pursuit of quasi-technological rents which would 
have propelled development based on innovation and 
the generation of genuine competitive advantages. 
at the end of 1996 (equivalent to 2.4 months of im-
ports of goods and services) and the weight of the 
external public debt was reduced, so that in 1997 it 
came to only 14% of GDP: a very low figure by the 
standards of the region (table 1). In spite of these 
favourable indicators, however, the real growth of the 
economy was insufficient: it averaged 3.1%, which 
was barely higher than population growth (estimated 
at between 2.7% and 3%), so that per capita GDP 
remained unchanged. 
The monetary policy applied as from 1991 could 
be described as a "dual anchor" policy based on 
both the money supply and the exchange rate. The 
Central Bank's scheme aimed -without very much 
success- at maintaining moderate growth of the 
monetary aggregates (table 2), together with an 
exchange rate managed through a dirty float. This 
policy ended up by placing greater emphasis on 
the second element, since it was hard for the 
monetary authorities to control the money supply 
in a partially dollarized economy with enormous 
unregistered financial operations, and without 
any real possibilities of controlling foreign ex-
change movements inside and outside the coun-
try. Consequently, the partial anchoring of the 
exchange rate resulted in a substantial difference 
between the variations in prices of tradeable and 
non-tradeable goods and in considerable appre-
ciation of the currency (table 3). 
The macroeconomic scene in the 1990s 
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TABLE 1 
Paraguay: General indicators, 1989-1996 
(Millions of dollars at current prices, unless otherwise indicated) 
GDP 
GDP (millions of 1982 dollars) 
Per capita GDP (1982 dollars) 
GDP growth (%) 
Central government fiscal surplus 
(+) or deficit (-) 
As a percentage of GDP 
Non-financial public sector fiscal 
surplus (+) or deficit (-) 
As a percentage of GDP 
Monetary reserves 
External debt 






















































































































Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of official figures of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance of Paraguay. 
TABLE i 
Paraguay: Evolution of monetary aggregates and Inflation, 1989-1996 
(December-December variation, %) 














































Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of figures from the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
TABLE 3 
Paraguay: Evolution of relative prices, 1990-1996 















Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the 
Central Bank of Paraguay. 
Fiscal policy was used mainly as a support for 
the monetary strategy, with compulsory surpluses 
frozen in the Central Bank, thus explaining the good 
budgetary results. However, this was achieved at the 
cost of systematic cuts in infrastructural investments, 
which became the adjustment variable of fiscal ex-
penditure. As the country had not adopted a decisive 
policy of privatization of public works or their trans-
fer to the private sector, the lag in terms of infrastruc-
ture became still greater, which probably helps to ex-
plain the slow growth observed so far in the 1990s.2 
At the same time, the process of renewed access to 
external financing observed throughout the region 
extended to Paraguay too (Ffrench-Davis, 1996; Ani-
nat and Larrain, 1996) and from 1990 onwards there 
were substantial inflows of capital, mostly short-term 
(table 4, line 9). There was a simultaneous marked 
reduction in domestic saving (especially by house-
holds), with heavy growth of consumption expendi-
ture, marked by a high imported component. 
Part of this inflow of capital helped to increase 
the reserves. The rate of investment stagnated around 
its initial level of 23% of GDP throughout the period, 
and moreover its composition -in which there was an 
excessive preponderance of construction activities-
For an analysis of the infrastructural situation in the continent, 
see World Bank, 1996. 
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TABLE 4 
Paraguay: Macroeconomlc Indicators, 1989-1996 
1. Gross domestic product 
2. Gross national income 
3. Consumption (4+5) 
4. Public consumption 
5. Private consumption 
6. Investment 
7. Excess of expenditure 
over GDP (3+6-1) 
8. Excess of expenditure 
overGNI(3+6-2)=U 
9. Net inflow of capital 
10. Variation in reserves 
11. External saving (9-10)=8 
1. Gross domestic product 
2. Gross national income 
3. Consumption (4+5) 
4. Public consumption 
5. Private consumption 
6. Investment 
7. Excess of expenditure 
over GDP (3+6-1) 
8. Excess of expenditure 
over GNI (3+6-2)= 11 
9. Net inflow of capital 
10. Variation in reserves 
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Source: Prepared by the author from national accounts and balance of payments figures. 
meant that the efficiency of gross fixed capital for-
mation was low, as shown by the high incremental 
capital/product ratio of 9.5 for the period 1990-1996 
(or 6.9 if the two years of lowest growth are ex-
cluded) (Moon, 1997), which is almost the same as 
that of developed countries.3 It may be noted that the 
big institutional investors (the Social Security Insti-
tute and the other pension funds) have traditionally 
placed most of their funds in real-estate enterprises, 
thus helping to limit the resources available for 
productive investments. 
It is highly probable that the stabilization policy 
and the bias against the local production of tradeable 
3
 A high incremental capital/product ratio means that greater 
gross capital formation is needed in order to raise GDP growth by 
a given amount. The value observed in the case of Paraguay is 
higher than that of other countries with a similar level of in-
come. 
goods resulting from the tendency to over-valuation 
of the exchange rate not only hindered fixed capital 
formation but also led to serious under-utilization of 
the existing production capacity, partly explaining 
the mediocre growth rates of the secondary sector 
during the period. 
Another characteristic feature of the stabilization 
process was the failure to monitor the evolution of 
aggregate demand and, hence, of the expenditure-
product gap in recent years. This latter indicator dis-
played big fluctuations in relation to GDP and also in 
relation to gross national income, which is a variable 
representing the total amount of money available to the 
agents in a country for spending in a given period. 
The rapid increase in the expenditure-product 
gap in the 1990s indicates that insufficient attention 
was paid to the evolution of domestic expenditure 
and its compatibility with the economic policy of the 
country. Thus, between 1990 and 1995 domestic con-
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TABLE 5 
Paraguay: Composition of Imports, by type of goods, 1990-1996 
(As percentages of the total) 









































Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of figures from the Central Bank of Paraguay. 
sumption increased by 37.3% (a figure resulting 
from weighting the growth in private consumption 
(35.2%) and public consumption (58.6%)), whereas 
the GDP grew by only 17.3%.4 
As a consequence of exchange rate appreciation 
and the big increase in demand, there was a growing 
deficit on registered trade. Over the period 1989-
1995, imports grew by an average of 23% per year, 
whereas exports registered a trend decline of 2%. 
This phenomenon is similar to that observed in Latin 
America in general, since much of the recovery in 
demand in the region in the 1990s was satisfied with 
bigger imports. Indeed, the countries which did not 
make the timely corrections needed, such as Argen-
tina and Mexico, subsequently suffered traumatic re-
cessive adjustments (Ffrench-Davis, 1996). 
Even more interesting is what happened with re-
gard to the composition of imports. This composition 
changed substantially as from 1990, with the share of 
imports of capital goods going down from 47.6% in 
that year to 32.3% in 1996, while the share of im-
ports of consumer goods rose from 26.4% to 44.6% 
over the same period (table 5). 
The special features of Paraguay's external trade, 
however, which included a growing proportion of un-
registered trade in the 1990s, caused many observers 
to underestimate the effects of this situation on the 
macroeconomic performance of the country. There 
was a general belief that the excessive expenditure ob-
served or, what amounts to the same thing, the trade and 
current account deficits,5 were only apparent and were 
actually offset by a surplus on unregistered trade. 
Ill 
The external deficit and 
unregistered trade: an appraisal 
Paraguay's external trade has been marked in recent 
decades by the substantial share of unregistered 
trade. The appearance of this type of trade is ex-
plained not only by the country's special landlocked 
geographical situation but also by other factors: for 
example, its close relations with Brazil, high tariff 
levels which are not accompanied by an import sub-
stitution policy, multiple exchange rates, and political 
authorities which, under the dictatorship, were very 
indulgent to certain interest groups (Masi, 1995). Un-
registered trade, which consisted mainly of imports 
smuggled in from Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s, 
expanded towards the middle of the latter decade 
with the appearance of the so-called re-export trade 
based on the high protective tariffs applied in Brazil 
and Argentina to imports of finished goods such as 
4
 In this case, we have taken the sub-period 1989-1995, because 
the financial crisis which took place in May 1995 changed con-
sumption and investment tendencies and led to a drop in overall 
growth in 1996. 
5
 The accounting identities in the national accounts show that the 
trade deficit is equal to the excess of expenditure with respect to 
GDP, whereas the current account deficit corresponds to the ex-
cess of expenditure with respect to gross national income. 
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TABLE 6 
Paraguay: Registered and unregistered trade 























































1. Registered exports 
2. Registered imports 
3. Unregistered exports 
4. Unregistered imports 
5. Deficit on unregistered trade (3-4) 
B. As a percentage of GDP 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Source: Central Bank of Paraguay, on the basis of IMF, "Directions of Trade". 
1997 
1. Registered exports 
2. Registered imports 
3. Unregistered exports 
4. Unregistered imports 














































liquors, cigarettes, electronic items, perfumes, sports 
footwear, etc. This led to a new triangular trade flow 
of products from the Asian countries and, to a lesser 
extent, from the United States, which are re-exported 
to neighbouring countries. Likewise, because of the 
high taxes imposed within Brazil, goods such as 
cigarettes or clothing are brought into Paraguay from 
Brazil for subsequent re-export by sacoleiros to that 
same country.6 
In 1989, the informal "re-export" model was 
given official recognition by establishing tariff reduc-
tions for the so-called "tourist goods", and in 1991, 
as part of the tax reform, such goods were granted 
preferential VAT treatment (VAT of 2% instead of the 
uniform regular 10% rate). Finally, in 1995 a large 
number of these "tourist goods" were included in the 
lists of goods excepted from the MERCOSUR common 
tariff, which, in the case of Paraguay, consist of 399 
products on which the tariffs are to converge towards 
the 10% common external tariff within a period of 5 
to 10 years. 
With regard to the macroeconomic impact of this 
situation, an estimate of the trade flows represented 
by unregistered trade may be attempted by taking the 
6
 The name sacoleiros is applied to the persons who cross the 
Puente de la Amistad between Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and 
Foz de Iguaçu (Brazil) carrying goods in big bags. The incessant 
to and fro movement of of the sacoleiros accounts for a large 
part of the "re-exports" to Brazil. 
estimated figures prepared by the Central Bank of 
Paraguay on the basis of figures from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's "Directions of Trade" statis-
tics (table 6). When the unregistered trade balance 
is isolated in the official source it may be seen 
that, contrary to what is usually believed, this item 
registered deficits between 1989 and 1993 and only 
registered a clear surplus from 1995 on. 
This is a controversial conclusion, since the pre-
vailing belief is that unregistered trade has tradition-
ally shown a surplus. In addition to the estimates in 
question, however, there are two other facts which 
support the idea that unregistered trade showed a 
deficit up to 1994 which was only reversed as from 
1995. Firstly, 1995 marked the beginning of the re-
cessive cycle in Paraguay (i.e., the moment when do-
mestic demand went down and, with it, the demand 
for imports) and of the application of the Piano Real 
in Brazil, which gave rise to a consumption boom 
(including consumption of imported goods) through 
the stabilization of prices and appreciation of the lo-
cal currency. Secondly, it is a well-known fact that 
much of the unregistered imports from Brazil consist 
of "smuggled" foodstuffs, toilet articles, construction 
inputs,, etc. for domestic consumption, and that this 
trade prospered mainly up to 1994 because of the 
favourable exchange-rate conditions but went down 
appreciably after the adjustment of the Brazilian 
currency under the Piano Real (see annex). 
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If it is true that part of the unregistered imports 
were consumed within Paraguay instead of being re-
exported, this would be in keeping with the theory of 
a consumption boom arising from the analysis of 
other macroeconomic data. Thus, if unregistered 
trade showed a deficit throughout the first part of the 
1990s, then the economic authorities' decision to en-
dorse the import model (with its additional re-export 
component), especially through tariff and fiscal ad-
vantages but also through over-valuation of the national 
currency, helped to aggravate the macroeconomic im-
balances generated by the growth in consumption and 
excessive domestic absorption. Furthermore, the over-
emphasis on exploiting the competitive disadvantages 
of neighbouring countries (protectionism, high domes-
tic taxes) by particular interest groups took place at the 
expense of the exploitation of Paraguay's own com-
parative advantages, thereby contributing to the 
sluggish performance of local production units. 
The exhaustion of the import-based model as 
from 1995 with the entry into force of MERCOSUR 
and the process of tariff convergence, as well as the 
progressive blockage of cross-border trade by the 
Brazilian and Argentine authorities, has faced the 
country with the challenge of radically changing its 
economic policy lines towards a scheme compatible 
with the promotion of an export-oriented strategy.7 
This process must be actively promoted by the main 
economic agents, because it will not be automatic. It 
seems inevitable that the tariff convergence process 
begun in 1995 will lead to the diappearance of unreg-
istered re-export trade, by reducing the differences in 
the tariffs levied on finished goods in the various 
MERCOSUR countries. Nevertheless, Herken Krauer 
(1995) argues that in view of the relatively erratic 
characteristics of the integration process (such as the 
continued existence of non-tariff barriers and special 
modifications in the common external tariff) the fac-
tors responsible for such trade will continue to be the 
real exchange rate, non-tariff barriers and the finan-
cial and monetary instability of the member coun-
tries, so that Paraguay's re-export trade is likely to 
continue to have a firm basis, even though its profit 
margins may go down. 
IV 
Macroeconomic evolution and 
the financial system 
Between 1988 and 1992, a financial reform pro-
gramme was carried out in Paraguay which was 
aimed at liberalizing the system but which involved 
only some of the measures applied in other reform 
processes in Latin America (table 7). 
Two aspects are particularly noteworthy in this 
respect. Firstly, out of the eight measures listed in 
table 7, the only ones applied were the liberalization 
of interest rates and the reduction of compulsory re-
serve requirements. Secondly, the sequencing of the 
measures was clearly unsuitable:8 whereas these fi-
7
 The integration commitments undertaken by the country obvi-
ously include the obligation to apply policies aimed at checking 
illicit activities, since continuing to favour a model based on 
informal trade would give rise to the opposition of Paraguay's 
partners in MERCOSUR and make it impossible to develop such 
an export-oriented model. 
8
 For an analysis of financial reform processes in Latin America 
since 1988 and an assessment of the proper sequence of such 
reforms, see IDB, 1996. 
nancial variables were liberalized (together with the 
exchange rate and the possibility of effecting opera-
tions in foreign currency), no progress was made in 
the correction and supervision of a financial system 
hitherto marked by serious structural distortions, in-
cluding the custom of operating without the slightest 
risk, thanks to the automatic rediscounts granted by 
the Central Bank, and the formation of big cross-
linked portfolios in the main financial-industrial-
commercial groups (Duarte-Giménez, 1997). This 
context of rapid liberalization without the concomi-
tant strengthening of prudential supervision sowed 
the seeds of the future financial crisis of 1995.9 
The weak supervision exerted by the Office of 
the Superintendent of Banks in the period in question 
9
 The second financial crisis, in 1997, is viewed here as a con-
tinuation of that which occurred in 1995, because timely correc-
tive measures were not taken. 
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TABLE 7 
Paraguay: Financial reform measures, 1988-1995 
Liberalization Changes in compulsory Percentage of Privatization of 
of interest rates reserve requirements * managed loan market 
credit (State banks) 
Deposits Loans Local currency Foreign currency 
Yes Yes Reduced Unchanged Maintained in part No 
Greater independence Improved regulation Improved regulation Improved supervi-
of Central Bank of capital market of banks sion of banks 
N o b Yesc No d No e 
a
 Compulsory reserve requirement in national currency was gradually reduced from 42% in 1989 to 25% in 1994 (18% for banks which 
undertook to use the differential to provide credits for the cotton sector). This level was maintained until 1996. 
The Central Bank does not currently have legal or technical independence. 
c
 It should be noted that although legislation does exist and some 60 firms are currently quoted on the stock market, the activities of this 
v market essentially involve money market instruments. 
The new banking law was only adopted in 1996, after the 1995 financial crisis. 
e
 According to the assessment made by the IDB (IDB, 1996), banking supervision requires a major overhaul. This assessment still holds good 
today. 
permitted a big rise in the level of risk of the portfo-
lios of most banking institutions, as reflected in the 
rapid growth in the number of entities and in the total 
amount of private sector credit. Between 1989 and 
1994, 13 new banks and 38 finance companies were 
opened, attracted by the high profits promised by free 
interest rates.10 In the first years of this period, there 
was an excessive concentration of risks in the soy-
bean and cotton export sector, which led to a serious 
deterioration in loan portfolios when there were three 
consecutive years of poor harvests and depressed in-
ternational prices, further complicated by the grow-
ing over-valuation of the local currency with respect 
to the dollar. The necessary reorientation of credit 
activities towards other sectors was retarded by a per-
verse practice of the Central Bank, which, although it 
had officially done away with ad hoc rediscounts, 
introduced a system of reduced compulsory reserve 
requirements on cotton sector financing, thus per-
petuating the former system. 
10
 The excessive growth of the financial system is even more 
evident when it is considered that in 1994 there was one finan-
cial institution (bank or finance company) for every 47,000 in-
habitants. At that time (i.e., before the financial crisis) there 
were 34 banks and 65 finance companies, as well as various 
savings and loan cooperatives, savings and loan companies for 
housing loans, etc. 
The banks which did reorient their loan portfo-
lios did so by concentrating on activities that were at 
once more lucrative and more risky: consumer credit 
and credit cards, thus contributing to the consump-
tion bubble of the 1990s. The "black" financial sys-
tem also grew apace, thanks to the scant control 
exerted by the banking supervisory body and the tax 
authorities. An increasingly large proportion of the 
deposits received went to high-yield illicit activities 
such as smuggling, or to loans made at usurous inter-
est rates to firms operating in illicit ("black") activi-
ties. As a result, there were big rises in interest rates 
on both deposits and loans because of the need to 
procure more and more deposits to finance those 
high-risk activities. The implicit State guarantee on 
deposits further encouraged this. 
This behaviour was observed in the case of the 
majority of domestically-owned banks and finance 
companies. Their bad management practices (includ-
ing both mere inefficiency and operations outside the 
law) led them to seek clients -of an increasingly 
risky nature- at higher and higher interest rates, thus 
reducing the quality of their loan portfolios. Further-
more, part of the resources was lent to persons or 
firms directly linked with the owners of the banks 
concerned, without applying proper project evalu-
ation criteria, so that many of these financial institu-
tions ran up heavy losses. 
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The banking system was marked, however, by a 
clear situation of duality, since on the other hand 
there were institutions -mostly branches of foreign-
owned banks -which were able to adapt to the cir-
cumstances thanks to better management and in any 
case had traditionally restricted their supply of credit 
to top-level clients (big firms, external trade opera-
tions with their home countries). This fact, together 
with the concentration of the local banks on specula-
tive activities or consumer loans, meant that a large 
segment of the productive sector -small and me-
dium-sized enterprises, and especially those which 
were not linked with some financial group- had little 
access to bank credit during this period. 
Economic theory on the functioning of financial 
markets analyses the reasons why the money market 
is a complex market in which prices (interest rates) 
do not always adjust to balance supply and demand 
and in which balances may be produced through ra-
tioning (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). They are subject 
to effects of "adverse selection" and "incitements" 
which mean that interest rates channel information 
relating not only to levels of supply and demand but 
also to the quality of clients. The result is that yields 
grow in line with interest rates (although more 
slowly) up to a certain level, after which the expected 
yield decreases. In keeping with this phenomenon of 
the "adverse selection" effect -the fact that the 
clients willing to pay higher rates are also those 
with the highest risks- rational financial institu-
tions limit their supply of credit even though there is 
still unsatisfied demand. 
Moreover, because of the situation of tacit oli-
gopoly existing in the Paraguayan financial market, 
the foreign-owned banks did not appreciably reduce 
their rates but merely set them a little below those of 
the most inefficient or daring financial intermediar-
ies, thereby obtaining high rates of return. Thus, 
average annual interest rates remained very high 
during the period: negative rates on deposits, and 
rates on loans which fluctuated between 10% and 
20%, with differences of between 15% and 20%. 
Because of this dichotomy of the financial sys-
tem and the specialization of banking institutions, 
credit to certain sectors was rationed, while there was 
a big increase in credit to other higher-yield activities 
such as commerce, finance and various kinds of in-
TABLE8 
Paraguay: Ratio of growth rate of credit 
to growth rate of GDP, 1989-1995 
Locally-owned banks 10.4 
Foreign-owned banks 4.6 
Public-sector banks 4.7 
Total banking system 62 
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the 
Central Bank of Paraguay. 
formal activities. Between 1989 and 1995 there was 
thus a rapid but not exaggerated increase in total 
credit, from 10.8% to 19.7% of GDP. The sustainabil-
ity of this growth may be better appreciated when it 
is compared with the degree of penetration of finan-
cial activity. In real terms, the ratio of the growth rate 
of credit to the growth rate of GDP during the period 
was 6.2 (table 8): a somewhat higher ratio than those 
registered in other countries with a similar degree of 
penetration, such as Argentina and Colombia (The 
Economist, 1997, p. 19). 
As already noted, however, the growth in credit 
was more pronounced in the case of the locally-owned 
private banks than in that of the foreign-owned banks 
and the public banking system, the respective average 
annual growth rates being 32.2%, 14.4% and 14.7% 
in real terms. Taking only the locally-owned private 
banks, the ratio was 10.4: comparable to that of 
Mexico in the same period, and much higher than the 
level considered to be sustainable. 
At the same time, the very big inflows of capital 
registered in the period were only partially sterilized 
and fed the boom in short-term credit to high-yield 
activities, as well as providing a steady flow of re-
sources to the real estate sector.11 A number of 
poorly-timed economic policy decisions, especially 
the decision to free the funds belonging to public 
bodies which had previously been deposited in the 
Central Bank, without properly regulating the use to 
be made of them, helped to aggravate the situation 
still further, since these resources simply went to the 
activities offering the highest interest rates. 
For an analysis of the relation between capital flows and the 
financial sector, see Folkerts-Lindau and others, 1995. 
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V 
Conclusion: Consumption bubble 
and financial crisis 
In 1995, a combination of events subjected the finan-
cial bodies with the highest exposure to excessive 
tensions, including the unfavourable evolution of in-
ternational soybean prices, which caused heavy 
losses in some firms over-involved in the financing 
of the harvest, and the decline in capital inflows after 
the Mexican crisis. Another event which helped to 
set off the crisis, at the domestic level, was the dis-
covery of a serious case of embezzlement of funds 
from the vaults of the Central Bank through the di-
version of funds corresponding to the compulsory re-
serves of the commercial banks, with the complicity 
of representatives of those private bodies. 
Banks which had run up losses exceeding their 
net worth (in some cases by several times that figure) 
as a result of unregistered operations, speculative ac-
tivities and loans to related enterprises found them-
selves in a state of illiquidity and had to face runs on 
their deposits. The fact that the situation reached this 
level was due largely to shortcomings in supervision, 
since the annual balances of some banks which then 
had to be officially intervened had not been approved 
for several years, without anyone doing anything 
about this. 
Gavin and Hausmann (1995) see the financial 
crises of many Latin American countries as the result 
of a macroeconomic upset coinciding with conditions 
of weakness of the financial system, so that the 
"chain" (the system) breaks at its weakest "link" (the 
affected banks). In the case of Paraguay, the weak-
ness in question was due mainly to high-risk or illicit 
("black") activities and loans to enterprises linked 
with the banks themselves. In the light of what was 
set forth earlier in this article, however, the 1995 fi-
nancial crisis may be said rather to be a symptom of 
the bursting of a consumption bubble largely con-
nected with the growth of the informal sector and 
illicit financial activities and fed by big capital in-
flows. 
The breakage of the chain of payments and cred-
its which followed the financial problems of 1995 
was due essentially to the sudden blockage of the use 
of post-dated cheques as instruments of commercial 
transactions and informal credit. Post-dated cheques, 
which were illegal at the time, had become the main 
instrument of alternative credit, because of the means 
of enforcement imparted to them by the fact that the 
issue of cheques without funds was punishable by 
imprisonment. At the same time, the financial institu-
tions had developed a black market for rediscounting 
these instruments through their associated finance 
companies. The collapse of several banks which were 
active in this business and public mistrust in the 
banking system were then reflected in the abrupt ter-
mination of these operations, which further aggra-
vated the recessionary impact of the crisis. 
With regard to the prevailing macroeconomic 
context, it would appear that bad policies, in the 
sense of permitting an exaggerated increase in spend-
ing on the one hand and neglecting proper supervison 
of the banks in a context of financial liberalization on 
the other, prepared the ground for the crisis. Finally, 
the ill-advised option for an import-based model and 
three-way trading, with a permissive attitude to un-
registered trade, helped to worsen the imbalances in 
question, resulting in the need for a severe recession-
ary adjustment after the 1995 financial crisis. The 
economic policy flaws shown up by the behaviour of 
the variables between 1989 and 1995 points to the 
need for a sustainable and growth-oriented macroe-
conomic strategy (ECLAC, 1995). 
As well as placing the financial system on a 
sound basis and strengthening banking supervision 
-prior requisites for any sustainable macroeconomic 
strategy- it is also necessary to watch domestic 
spending more closely and impose suitable regulation 
of capital flows. The economic statistics (specifically 
those on the external sector) also need to be im-
proved: an unavoidable condition closely linked with 
the adoption of a different economic model. 
With regard to the bubble phenomenon analysed 
here, a more detailed analysis of its organizational-
institutional aspect is called for (see Nochteff, 1996), 
for in each of the markets in question this phenome-
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non is linked to the exploitation of quasi privilege 
rents by groups enjoying various kinds of protection. 
Thus, the persistence of an import-based model with 
important smuggling and re-export components 
-in contradiction with the declared liberalization and 
export-oriented strategy- was due to the preservation 
of the benefits of some particular agents, at the ex-
pense of greater use of the country's own compara-
tive advantages (Herken Krauer, 1995). Likewise, for 
a number of years numerous inappropriate practices 
were tolerated in the financial sphere although their 
existence was well known, thus giving rise to fat 
profits for certain economic groups and the excessive 
growth of loan portfolios connected with unsustain-
able activities, all of which finally culminated in the 
1995 financial crisis. 
Annex 
The problem of statistics in Paraguay, 
with special reference to the external sector 
The unreliability of economic statistics in Paraguay 
is an obstacle to systematic analysis of the perform-
ance of the Paraguayan economy, since it makes it 
necessary -as in the present article- to use multiple 
sources, not all of them consistent with each other, 
and to fill some gaps with estimates. 
Data are relatively abundant in the monetary sec-
tor. However, the high percentage of unregistered ac-
tivities, which became evident after the 1995 
financial crisis, leads one to believe that the mone-
tary indicators only reflect a part of the real situation. 
It is known, for example, that many financial institu-
tions were receiving three types of deposits: "white" 
(with an official receipt, and duly recorded in the 
accounts of the bank); "grey" (with an official 
receipt, but not recorded in the accounts), and "black" 
(without any official receipt or record in the ac-
counts), which were likewise reflected in three types 
of accounts conesponding to each class of deposit 
(World Bank, 1996). It may be assumed that this situ-
ation has improved since 1995, due to the disappear-
ance of various banks which were very active on the 
black market. The most reliable indicator is probably 
the consumer price index, whose base was renewed 
in 1995. The same cannot be said of the indicators on 
the monetary aggregates, because of the problems of 
registration in the financial system sources. 
With regard to the real sector of the economy 
and the national accounts, there are systematic re-
cords, but they are very inaccurate because of ap-
proximations in their preparation. The unregistered 
activities of many economic agents, as described ear-
lier in this article, partly explain their reluctance to 
provide data to the public authorities. Consequently, 
although the system of national accounts is governed 
by the appropriate procedures -since 1997 the proce-
dures used are those of the United Nations System of 
National Accounts, 1993, version 4- in many cases it 
lacks reliable inputs in the form of empirical data. 
It is estimated that the gross domestic product has 
traditionally been greatly underestimated by 
amounts varying -according to the sources used-
from 30% to 60%. 
The data which must be viewed with the greatest 
caution, however, are undoubtedly those of the exter-
nal sector, because of the country's long tradition as a 
centre of unregistered trade in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America. The problems stem from both the 
non-registration and the under-registration of the true 
values of goods. The only sources available for trying 
to correct these shortcomings are the "Directions of 
Trade" estimates of the International Monetary Fund, 
published by the Central Bank of Paraguay (table 6). 
The methodology consists of cross-checking the offi-
cial Paraguayan information (customs registers) with 
official data on exports to and imports from Paraguay 
by the country's main trading partners (Brazil, Argen-
tina, the United States, Japan, Taiwan, etc.) in order to 
estimate possible omissions and under-estimates from 
the discrepancies observed. These data are used in 
the preparation of the national accounts. In the proc-
ess, however, they undergo adjustments which mean, 
for example, that the external deficit (calculated with 
respect to both GDP and GNI) does not coincide with 
the corresponding balance of payments figures or 
those of the national accounts. 
Table 4 presents a set of calculations by the 
author which seek to overcome these methodological 
difficulties. The lower part of the table has been ad-
justed by estimating the variation in the reserves in 
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constant-value guaraníes on the basis of their value in 
current dollars (at the current exchange rate and the 
implicit price index of the GDP) and then deducing 
the total capital inflow from that value and from the 
external saving given by the national accounts (upper 
part of the table). This is necessarily an approxima-
tion, since it is not feasible to use the preferred 
method, which would be to compute the two parts of 
the table separately in order to check their degree of 
coincidence. 
With regard to the magnitude of unregistered 
trade, the first conclusion to be drawn from these 
estimates is that unregistered trade in Paraguay 
amounts to almost unbelievable levels: in 1994, for 
example, the estimated unregistered exports and im-
ports represented 179% and 66% of registered ex-
ports and imports. 
At the same time, according to the same esti-
mates, unregistered trade showed a deficit between 
1989 and 1993, broke even in 1994, and turned in 
surpluses as from 1995 (table 6). This result, which is 
of crucial importance for macroeconomic analysis, 
may be explained intuitively by a number of factors. 
Firstly, thanks to the prevailing exchange rate condi-
tions, the "smuggling" of Brazilian products for do-
mestic consumption in Paraguay (foodstuffs, toilet 
articles, construction inputs, etc.) reached its peak in 
the period up to 1994 (when the over-valuation of the 
guaraní with respect to the Brazilian currency came 
to an end with the introduction of the Piano Real in 
the latter country), which is in keeping with the fact 
that part of the unregistered imports remained in the 
country and were not re-exported. Secondly, 1995 
Aninat, E. and C. Larrain (1996): Capital flows: Lessons 
from the Chilean experience, CEPAL Review, No. 60, 
LC/G.1943-P, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Campos, L. (1995): Cosío del dinero en el Paraguay: de 
la administración burocrática de las tasas a su 
liberalización. Efectos sobre el mercado, "Estudios" 
series, No. 10, Asunción, Centro Paraguayo para la 
Promoción de la Libertad Económica y de la Justicia 
Social (CEPPRO), December. 
CEPPRO (1994a): Proyecto de Carta Orgánica del Banco 
Central del Paraguay: comentarios críticos y 
propuestas, Asunción. 
was marked by substantial changes in the Paraguayan 
and Brazilian economies. In Paraguay, a markedly 
recessionary cycle began which reduced the coun-
try's capacity to absorb imports, while in Brazil the 
introduction of the Piano Real gave rise to a con-
sumption boom and appreciation of the national cur-
rency, and the trade balance, which had been 
showing a surplus for years, began to register defi-
cits. Obviously, part of Brazil's additional imports 
came from Paraguay and were not always officially 
registered. At the same time, however, the exchange-
rate-based stabilization plan was accompanied as 
from 1995 with the scheduled convergence of tariff 
levels with MERCOSUR, so that the average Brazilian 
tariffs underwent sharp reductions, probably leading 
to a considerable increase in imports from outside the 
area. These factors back up the theory that the 
macroeconomic conditions prevailing between 1989 
and 1994 strengthened the consumption-oriented 
tendencies of the Paraguayan economy and that 
there was indeed a deficit which was only reversed 
after 1994. 
In the light of this analysis, both the available 
estimates and the evolution of the macroeconomic 
variables suggest that up to 1994 unregistered trade 
helped to aggravate the excessive domestic absorp-
tion described in the present article, backing up the 
theory that there was a domestic consumption 
bubble. Finally, it may be noted that after 1995 the 
surplus on unregistered trade represented only a 
small fraction of the deficit on registered trade, so 
that a substantial excess of absorption still persisted. 
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